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Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which additional perceptual experiences are elicited
by sensory stimuli or cognitive concepts. Synesthetes possess a unique type of
phenomenal experiences not directly triggered by sensory stimulation. Therefore,
for better understanding of consciousness it is relevant to identify the mental and
physiological processes that subserve synesthetic experience. In the present work we
suggest several reasons why synesthesia has merit for research on consciousness.
We first review the research on the dynamic and rapidly growing field of the studies
of synesthesia. We particularly draw attention to the role of semantics in synesthesia,
which is important for establishing synesthetic associations in the brain. We then propose
that the interplay between semantics and sensory input in synesthesia can be helpful
for the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, especially when making use
of ambiguous stimuli for inducing synesthesia. Finally, synesthesia-related alterations of
brain networks and functional connectivity can be of merit for the study of consciousness.
Keywords: synesthesia, consciousness, semantics, parietal cortex, effective connectivity, qualia, NCC, ambiguous
stimuli
INTRODUCTION
Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which a presentation of a stimulus, or inducer, produces additional
phenomenal experiences, or concurrents, for which no physical sensory inputs exist. For instance,
the letter “A” may trigger an experience of red color (Hochel and Milán, 2008) even though there is
nothing that can be established as objectively red in the stimulus. Rather, the experience of color red
is created exclusively internally. Synesthetic mappings of the inducing stimulus and the concurrent
experience are automatic and involuntary, unique for each individual, and generally stable over
time (Wollen and Ruggiero, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; but see Simner, 2012). The prevalence
of synesthesia in the normal population is estimated to be around 1–2% (Simner et al., 2006).
Synesthesia is a unique subject for research particularly because of the additional phenomenal
experiences, i.e., the concurrent qualia. How and why phenomenal experience arises is part of
the “hard” problem in consciousness research (e.g., Chalmers, 1995). Many requirements that are
necessary for us to be conscious of the world around us can be explained in terms of functioning,
information processing, circuits or systems—for instance, the integration of information by a
cognitive system, deliberate control of behavior, and the reportability of mental states (also,
among others, named the “easy” problems of consciousness; Chalmers, 1995). This is the relatively
easier problem. However, it has turned out much more difficult to explain the mechanisms of
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subjective experience or “what things feel like.” Examples of
subjective experiences are for instance the experience of seeing
red, or the experience of feeling the wind on your face on a sunny
day. This aspect of consciousness is considered harder to account
for.
Many empirical studies have been undertaken to identify
neural correlates of conscious experience (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Singer, 2001; Melloni et al., 2007; Aru
et al., 2012). According to Crick (1994) neural correlates
of consciousness is “the minimal set of neuronal events
leading to subjective awareness” (Cohen and Dennett, 2011,
p.358); Opinions differ widely on how and whether conscious
experience can be accounted for by the physiological processes
in the brain (Chalmers, 1995; Metzinger, 2000; Gray, 2005;
Cohen and Dennett, 2011). For instance, there is no agreement
on whether conscious experience and cognitive processing
are integrated or not (e.g., Cohen and Dennett, 2011); and on
whether conscious experience is established by means of global
integration of information (e.g., Lamme, 2006) or by activity in
e.g., localized brain areas (Zeki, 2001).
Several researchers have proposed ways in which
consciousness research can benefit from the phenomenon
of synesthesia. Gray (2005) has argued that synesthesia can
provide a window on the hard problem of consciousness.
Specifically, Gray proposes that synesthesia can make a case
against functionalism—a theory stating that the mental states
that constitute consciousness can be defined as interactions
between different functional processes. Its prediction, according
to Gray, is that for any difference in function, there should
be a corresponding difference in subjective experience. The
argument put forward by Gray (2005) is that in e.g., colored-
hearing synesthesia, two different functions (hearing and color
vision) lead to the same subjective experience of color—which
is allegedly mediated in brain areas related to color vision. In
the meantime, several neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
that synesthetic color and veridical color perception do not
necessarily share the same neuronal correlates i.e., activated
brain regions (Van Leeuwen et al., 2010; Hupé et al., 2012).
Moreover, synesthetic colors are often qualitatively different
from veridical colors in the sense of texture, quality, and
specificity of colors (Eagleman and Goodale, 2009).
Sagiv and Frith (2013) proposed that synesthesia can be used
as a model problem for understanding conscious experience for
several reasons. Synesthesia is phenomenologically defined while
its properties can be studied in detail; there are a wide variety of
types of synesthesia providing ample possibilities for testing the
neural correlates of various kinds of experiences; synesthetes are
normally healthy people and are much more easy to find than
for instance patients with specific neurological symptoms. Sagiv
et al. suggest that synesthesia should be helpful in the search for
the neural correlates of consciousness. In consciousness research
it is common to use paradigms in which a subjective change in
perception takes place while the stimuli remain constant. Hence,
synesthesia can be seen as a special case of changes in subjective
experiences that can be contrasted to the conscious percepts of
other people in response to the same stimuli. Another interesting
point made by Sagiv et al. is with regard to the proposal by Zeki
(2001) that consciousness is mediated by “essential (localized)
nodes” in the brain that are required for conscious experience.
Taking color as an example, synesthesia lends support for that
hypothesis because localized differences in activity level of color
regions in the brain have been reported for color synesthesia (see
e.g., Van Leeuwen et al., 2010; Rouw et al., 2011).
In the present work we suggest several additional reasons why
synesthesia has merit for research on consciousness. We first
review the research on the dynamic and rapidly growing field of
the studies of synesthesia to inform the reader of the current state
of affairs. We pay specific attention to the role of semantics in
synesthesia, which seems important for establishing synesthetic
associations in the brain. We then propose that the interplay
between semantics and sensory input in synesthesia can be
helpful for the studies of the neural correlates of consciousness,
especially when making use of ambiguous stimuli for inducing
synesthesia. Finally, alterations of functional connectivity and
physical network connectivity discovered in the brains of
synesthetes can be useful for the studies of consciousness.
THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC ASSOCIATIONS
IN SYNESTHESIA
Synesthesia is a phenomenon that has been known for a long
time, with reports dating back as far as 1812 (see Jewanski
et al., 2009), but only recently has the phenomenon received
due attention from researchers, leading to an explosion in
research efforts, largely kicked off by Cytowic’s (1993) book
“The man who tasted shapes.” The most common tests to
determine genuine synesthesia is the test-retest task to assess
the consistency of the synesthetic experiences (e.g., Baron-
Cohen et al., 1987). In addition, variants of Stroop interference
tasks (Stroop, 1935) are often used to provide evidence for
the automatic nature of synesthetic associations (Wollen and
Ruggiero, 1983; Nikolic´ et al., 2011). It should be noted that
for certain types of synesthesia, the automaticity has also been
questioned (Mattingley, 2009; Price andMattingley, 2013). There
are even online resources that enable one to determine whether
he or she is a synesthete (e.g., www.synesthete.org; Eagleman
et al., 2007). Many different forms of synesthesia exist. Inducers
may be letters, words, numbers, time-units (days of week,
months), personal names, music, smell, taste, etc. . . (Day, 2014).
However, there are differences in the prevalence of different
forms of synesthesia. Just graphemes and time-units may account
for 70–80% of all incidences of synesthesia (Day, 2014). There are
some very rare forms of synesthesia such as e.g., swimming-style
to color synesthesia (Nikolic´ et al., 2011).
The Nature of Inducers
There has been quite a controversy on what the nature
of synesthesia really is and how the associations are being
created. Before discussing this issue further, it is important to
note that little, if anything, is known about how phenomenal
experiences may come about in physiological systems. It was
therefore difficult for theories of synesthesia to be created
on the basis of strong empirical or theoretical foundations.
The most straightforward and simple hypothesis was that the
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additional experiences have to do with additional activation
of neurons—presuming rather bluntly, a direct correspondence
between elevated firing rates of neurons and phenomenal
experience. For example, a neuron coding for red color
would be activated and this would then lead, in some
unspecified way, to the experience of red. The activation
would then come through connections originating from a
different brain area—e.g., from the grapheme area to the
color area (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001). These theories
are inspired by the connectionist approach to the brain
(McClelland and Rumelhart, 1985), and can be referred to
as connection-activation theories (Grossenbacher and Lovelace,
2001; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001).
In early days of synesthesia research the theories of aberrant
sensory-to-sensory connections were the only ones discussed
and studies concentrated on the mechanisms of the hypothetical
activation, direct excitation or disinhibition (Grossenbacher and
Lovelace, 2001; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001). However,
later investigations of synesthetic phenomena suggested that the
sensory-sensory view of synesthesia should be expanded to allow
for concepts that can induce synesthesia. It has often been shown
that it is not necessarily the sensory inputs that evoke synesthetic
concurrents, but rather the extracted meaning of the stimulus.
For grapheme-color synesthesia—the most common form and
the most frequently studied—this semantic component has been
shown reliably and from many different angles (see Chiou and
Rich, 2014 for a recent review). For example, one and the same
physical stimulus would evoke a different concurrent depending
on how the stimulus was interpreted (e.g., the same shape can
be understood as an S or as number 5; e.g., Myles et al., 2003;
Dixon et al., 2006). Also, it has been shown that new synesthetic
associations can be created immediately (within minutes) as new
meanings are given to symbols (Mroczko et al., 2009). Indeed,
it became soon clear for the most common, and thus most
thoroughly studied, forms of synesthesia that they are conceptual
in nature (Simner et al., 2006; Novich et al., 2011). Most obvious
examples of conceptual synesthesias are days of the week that are
colored by their meaning or position in the sequence (Sagiv et al.,
2006) as opposed to (or simultaneous with) being colored by the
colors of the letter with which the name of the weekday begins;
and synesthesias for abstract representations of numerosity such
as dice patterns and finger counting—despite the different surface
forms, the same number elicits the same color in all cases (Ward
and Sagiv, 2007; Ward et al., 2007). Dixon et al. (2000) also
demonstrated that synesthesia can occur when synesthetes are
merely thinking of the inducing stimulus.
These findings of the relevance of semantics were paralleled
with failures to replicate the so-called perceptual “pop-out”
that certain synesthetes reportedly experience for stimuli that
normally do not induce pop-out. Initial case studies had indicated
synesthetes experience pop-out (an immediate percept) during
visual search (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001; Palmeri
et al., 2002), but more elaborate (large sample size) studies
revealed that this was actually not the case, at least for the
majority of synesthetes (Edquist et al., 2006; Sagiv et al.,
2006; Gheri et al., 2008; Laeng, 2009; Rothen and Meier,
2009). Synesthetes may show a slight benefit at visual search
compared to non-synesthetes (e.g., Palmeri et al., 2002), but
for a large majority of synesthetes, synesthesia does not occur
pre-attentively (Ward et al., 2010).
These developments had implications for understanding
synesthesia. The notion of direct sensory-to-sensory connections
as the only mechanism explaining synesthesia had to be
revised, requiring researchers to incorporate semantics as a
mediator in the process. This has led to the introduction
of the term ideasthesia, meaning “sensing concepts” (idea is
Ancient Greek for concept), as a description of the phenomenon
(Nikolic´, 2009). In essence, ideasthesia is an equivalent to
the recently studied phenomena of semantically-mediated
crossmodal correspondences (Rubinsten and Henik, 2002;
Gallace and Spence, 2006), but, when applied to synesthesia, it
generates a specific set of predictions and constraints. Ideasthesia
suggests that synesthetes are not born with their associations,
as has been suggested earlier, but that the associations have
been created by an active process of assigning meaning to a
stimulus (to the inducer; Mroczko-Wasowicz and Nikolic´, 2014).
This happens especially in situations in which synesthetes have
difficulties in assigning meaning to stimuli during learning—
i.e., a so-called “semantic vacuum.” The theory proposes that
synesthetic associations are created to enhance the understanding
of the world—to build knowledge. The theory has a strong
explanatory power in accounting for the fact that letters,
numbers, days of week, and months are the most common
inducers; these stimuli are the first abstract concepts that a child
is faced with through the educational system. A child has to
build a whole new semantic network and a synesthetic child uses
synesthesia to enhance this process.
Ideasthesia is consistent with the finding that synesthetes seem
to “choose” the concurrent from various sources, before they
internalize one of the options and stick with it for a lifetime
(e.g., Simner and Bain, 2013). The “choices” for synesthetic
concurrents can come from internal and external sources. Many
of the crossmodal associations that exist in synesthesia follow
patterns of crossmodal associations in non-synesthetes: for
instance, the association of high tones with lighter colors and
low tones with darker colors (Simner et al., 2005; Ward et al.,
2006). Other associations are suggested directly from the external
environment, such as the refrigerator-magnet letters (Witthoft
and Winawer, 2006, 2013), and others are combinations such as
the similarity between shapes of letters that lead to similarities
in associated colors (e.g., Brang et al., 2011; Jürgens and Nikolic´,
2012), or the sounds of letters (e.g., Mills et al., 2002).
Ideasthesia is not necessarily incompatible with the idea
of direct sensory-to-sensory connections in some forms
of synesthesias. Relatively noisy and less restricted cortical
activation to new (and abstract) stimuli encountered during
learning may theoretically lead to random sensory-sensory co-
activation in the brain. Synesthetes may be somehow particularly
vulnerable or sensitive to such cross-activations (Bargary and
Mitchell, 2008; Newell and Mitchell, 2015). During learning,
however, semantic processes seem to shape the representation of
the (abstract) stimuli and the associated synesthetic experience
either becomes incorporated in the higher-level representation
of the stimulus, or not (Van Leeuwen, 2014). Newell andMitchell
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(2015) propose that although synesthesia may be predisposed in
certain individuals, this does not exclude a strong influence of
experience and semantics on the final phenotype of synesthesia.
Ideasthesia is compatible with this view, but does pose that many
forms of synesthesia are strongly dependent on semantics. Note
that ideasthesia is not the same as synesthesia without physical
input. It is rather the way the physical input is translated into
semantics that sets ideasthesia apart.
Implications for Understanding Conscious
Experience
We propose that most of the synesthetic experiences are
mediated through semantics. This suggests that also other
experiences should be modified by semantics. In fact, Milán
et al. (2013) found that cross-modal associations of experiences
are not sparse or isolated. Instead, those associations are tightly
interconnected into an associative network that closely resembles
the semantic network of words. A common example of cross-
modal association is a relation of color to temperature (i.e., red
is hot, blue is cold) or auditory pitch to visual size (low pitch
for large objects and high pitch for small objects; see Spence,
2011 for a review of various crossmodal correspondences). For
their study Milán et al. (2013) used Kiki-Bouba shapes (Köhler,
1947) as they found that these shapes have rich personality
properties commonly shared among individuals. They conclude
that everyday experiences undergo also a form of ideasthesia.
This work is closely related to studies of connative meaning
(e.g., Walker and Walker, 2012; Walker et al., 2012) in which it
is predicted that the same set of cross-sensory correspondences
should always emerge regardless of the specific sensory channel
(e.g., brightness and high pitch, high pitch and sharpness, etc.)
because there is overlap in the semantic interpretation of the
stimuli from different modalities. In the framework proposed
by Walker et al. (2012) sensory features become linked together
conceptually; in Milán et al. (2013) it is also concepts (e.g.,
personality) that become linked in an associative network.
Research on synesthesia provides a strong case for the role of
semantics in phenomenal experience, and this may be helpful
in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. In
synesthetes, dependent on context, an ambiguous synesthesia-
inducing stimulus (e.g., 5/S) may be accompanied by a different
percept. Similar ambiguous stimuli are also available for non-
synesthetes such as bi-stable percepts of the Rubin vase/faces
or Necker cube; the difference being that in synesthesia,
the additional synesthetic percept is unrelated to the actual
physical sensory input. This suggests possibly a larger separation
in the neural representation of the ambiguous stimulus in
synesthetes, and thus an easier detection of differential activation
with neuroimaging methods in this population. It should
be noted, however, that in studying the neural correlates of
synesthesia inducing stimuli, both the inducing stimulus and
the concurrent synesthetic experience will result in changes
in brain activity when the interpretation of the ambiguous
stimuli changes. Cross-modality synesthesias might therefore
be most suitable for consciousness paradigms, e.g., ambiguous
auditory phonemes/words eliciting a color ([ph]/[f], know/no).
Moreover, in synesthesia, it has been well established that the
change in percept of the ambiguous stimulus is mediated in
a top-down fashion—from semantics to the percept. In the
case of non-synesthetic ambiguous stimuli, it may be more
difficult to disentangle changes in the percept mediated top-down
from those occurring through slight differences in bottom-up
processing. We therefore propose that synesthesia and especially
the role of top-down semantic influences therein can be helpful
in determining neural correlates of consciousness, not only with
respect to localization but also with respect to the involved
networks and possible dynamic interactions between higher and
lower level brain areas.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF SYNESTHESIA
Profiting from non-invasive techniques for recording brain
activity and from established research paradigms of cognitive
neuroscience, search for the physiological underpinnings of
synesthesia has become possible. One of the goals is to discover
a physiological difference between the brains of synesthestes
and non-synesthetes. Another, arguably even more important,
goal is to identify physiological parameters that distinguish
between an activated phenomenal experience and a lack of such
experience (“neural correlates of consciousness”). In the latter
case, the unique properties of synesthetic minds may allow for
the needed experimental controls—the presence of an additional
experience. If this quest were successful, it may bring us closer
to understanding the physiology of phenomenal experience. It
should be noted that in synesthesia research, between-group
comparisons always bear the problem of individual differences
between subjects and the possibility that the synesthete group
also differs from non-synesthetes on other aspects (e.g., artistic
qualities, mental imagery, or personality, see e.g., Ward et al.,
2008; Rouw et al., 2011; Banissy et al., 2013).
Brain Function and Structure in
Synesthetes
Contrasting synesthetic experience with the absence of such
an experience, fMRI studies point to excess activity in brain
regions that are involved in the processing of the concurrent
synesthetic experience. Examples are activity in cortical area
V4/V8 when experiencing synesthetic color (e.g., Sperling et al.,
2006; Van Leeuwen et al., 2010; for a review, see Rouw
et al., 2011), activity in intraparietal sulci for number-form
synesthesia (Tang et al., 2008), or excess activity in piriform
cortex for olfactory synesthetic concurrents (Chan et al., 2014).
The literature is not very consistent, however: For example,
not all studies of grapheme-color synesthesia report activity in
color area V4 for synesthesia (Rouw et al., 2011). One of the
most common findings is excess activity in parietal regions for
synesthetes, independent of the specific synesthetic subtype (e.g.,
Van Leeuwen et al., 2010; Rouw et al., 2011; Neufeld et al., 2012a).
Thus, the results may imply a particularly important role of
parietal cortex in mediating phenomenal synesthetic experiences.
Electrophysiological studies have demonstrated abnormal
processing of synesthesia-inducing stimuli in early processing
phases (Beeli et al., 2008; Goller et al., 2009; Brang et al.,
2010), over-responsiveness to non-synesthetic parvocellular
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visual stimuli (Barnett et al., 2008), and abnormal processing of
synesthetic concurrent experiences (Van Leeuwen et al., 2013).
Several electrophysiological studies suggest that synesthetic
effects can occur very early during the processing of the inducing
stimuli (105–115ms, Brang et al., 2010; 100ms, Goller et al.,
2009; 122ms, Beeli et al., 2008). For synesthesias clearly shown
to be based on concepts, such as grapheme-color synesthesia,
this would imply that semantics already plays a role early during
stimulus processing.
Studies of brain structure have demonstrated both increased
white matter and gray matter density (Rouw and Scholte, 2007,
2010; Hänggi et al., 2008; Jäncke et al., 2009; Weiss and Fink,
2009; Banissy et al., 2012; O’Hanlon et al., 2013; Zamm et al.,
2013). Regions in which such differences were found are often
related to the specific (functional) network of areas involved in
the type of synesthesia at hand. For instance, Rouw and Scholte
(2007) found increased white matter connectivity in temporal
regions close to the grapheme areas and in parietal regions for
grapheme-color synesthetes, while Hänggi et al. (2008) found
anatomical differences in the auditory and gustatory areas of
a tone-interval—taste synesthete. It should be noted that there
are also reports of globally altered brain topology in synesthetes
(Hänggi et al., 2011). However, it is important to keep in
mind that the reports of structural differences in the brains of
synesthetes are problematic in the sense that it is not possible
to determine—in adult synesthetes—whether the synesthesia is
a result of altered anatomy, or whether altered anatomy results
from years of synesthetic experience.
Dynamic Connectivity Patterns in
Synesthetes
Altogether, functional and structural neuroimaging studies
demonstrate synesthesia-specific alterations in the brain, related
to inducing stimuli as well as to concurrent synesthetic
experiences. The common theme, however, that emerges
from the neuroimaging literature is that communication and
connectivity between brain regions appear to be altered in
synesthesia. Let us take a look at functional connectivity changes
in synesthesia. Changes in functional connectivity patterns in
synesthetes have been reported with or without the presence
of external stimulation. Tomson et al. (2013) studied networks
in grapheme-color synesthetes’ brains during rest, auditory
grapheme stimulation, and audiovisual grapheme stimulation.
Synesthetes had more significant connections during rest and
auditory conditions. Investigating the connectivity between 90
anatomical regions, Tomson et al. found that synesthetes showed
increased network clustering in visual regions, in line with
the type of synesthesia they exhibited. It should be noted that
differences in connectivity patterns were also found during
rest; this was reported in another resting-state fMRI study as
well (Dovern et al., 2012). Dovern et al. found that during
rest, connectivity between visual and parietal networks was
enhanced for grapheme-color synesthetes, and that the increase
in intrinsic network connectivity correlated positively with the
strength (consistency) of synesthetic experiences. This work
strongly suggests that altered network function is linked to
altered conscious phenomenal experiences, even in absence of
direct stimulation.
Two more studies have investigated functional connectivity
during task performance. In auditory-visual synesthetes, using
sounds as stimuli, Neufeld et al. (2012b) found greater
connectivity between parietal regions and primary auditory and
visual cortices for synesthetes compared to controls. There was
no evidence of greater direct connectivity between auditory
and visual regions, suggesting a strong role for intermediate
areas such as parietal cortex during synesthetic experience. In
Sinke et al. (2012), grapheme-color synesthetes showed greater
connectivity between parietal regions and early visual cortex
(but not the grapheme area). Together these two studies are
in line with the resting state results reported above; functional
connectivity differences appear to be related to the brain areas
that are involved in the specific subtype of synesthesia, with
a prominent role for parietal regions. It is important to keep
in mind that alterations of functional connectivity can result
from either changes in direct physical connectivity or from the
alterations in the contribution of the semantic associations.
It is relevant for the study of consciousness—and for studies of
the physiology of synesthesia—to consider the strong individual
differences commonly detected among synesthetes. Not only do
different individuals experience different forms of synesthesia,
but also the nature of the concurrent experience can differ (for
a review, see van Leeuwen, 2013). One of the most common
distinctions in subjective experiences of the concurrent is its
spatial location. For instance, in grapheme-color synesthesia the
concurrent colors can be experienced either “in the mind’s eye,”
as if resembling an association, or “projected” into space e.g.,
located on the same surface as the inducing grapheme (Dixon
et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2007). These differences in phenomenal
experiences are highly informative for physiological studies on
synesthesia: If the phenomenal experiences differ, we can also
attempt to find the correlates of these differences in the brain
activity or anatomy. To this end, Van Leeuwen et al. (2011)
performed an effective-connectivity study, using dynamic causal
modeling of fMRI signals. Van Leeuwen et al. demonstrated that
the phenomenal experience of the synesthetic colors depends on
the direction of information flow between brain areas involved
in the phenomenon. For projectors, the data were fit best by a
model in which synesthesia modulated the direct influence of
the grapheme area onto color area V4. For associators, however,
a different model fit the data best—one in which V4 activity
was influenced indirectly via higher-order regions. This study
demonstrated that the quality of phenomenal experience can
depend on the route that information flow takes in the brain,
even though the same brain areas are implicated in two different
processes.
Two related studies have investigated anatomical changes in
the brain in relation to the projector vs. associator status of the
subjects. Rouw and Scholte (2007) showed that white matter
structural connectivity is generally enhanced in synesthetes.
More importantly, they found that white matter changes in
temporal regions—those that lay near the so-called grapheme
area—were more prominent for projector than for associator
synesthetes. In a later study on gray matter structure and
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function (Rouw and Scholte, 2010), the same authors reported
that projector synesthetes had increased gray matter density
compared to control subjects in areas generally responsible for
perception and action (i.e., visual, auditory, and motor cortex).
On the contrary, associators differed from controls in the gray
matter density of hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus,
which are regions primarily involved in memory. In conclusion,
even relatively subtle individual differences in phenomenal
synesthetic experiences can be correlated with identifiable
differences in activity and anatomy of brain regions.
THEORIES OF SYNESTHESIA
In the previous section we have discussed that concepts
can induce synesthesia—i.e., synesthetic inducers can be of
very abstract nature. The question is then, how do the
purported physiological mechanisms of synesthesia account for
the fact that synesthetic concurrents are shaped by semantic
knowledge? Generally speaking, the way we understand the
world exerts an influence on how we perceive it (Majid et al.,
2004). Apparently, this applies also to synesthetic concurrent
experiences. The mechanisms by which synesthesia is mediated
by the brain are still being debated and there are roughly
two groups of theories. The traditional approaches favor the
activation-through-connectivity mechanisms. These presume
that connections activate neurons, which then produce the
concurrent experiences. The two most important theories in this
group are the disinhibition or re-entrant theory (Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001; Smilek et al., 2001) and the cross-activation
account (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001; Brang et al.,
2010; Hubbard et al., 2011). Recently, another approach has
been proposed based on a new theory of how physiological
mechanisms implement semantics (Mroczko-Wasowicz and
Nikolic´, 2014; Nikolic´, 2015). We next discuss each approach in
more detail.
According to the disinhibited feedback theory, synesthesia is
caused by feedback signals sent from higher-order associative
regions to primary sensory regions not originally activated by
the inducing stimulus (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). An
example would be the activation of color area V4 via feedback
from associative parietal cortex after stimulation of the grapheme
area (but not color areas) by a black grapheme. This account of
synesthesia allows for context-based and top-down modulation
that affects synesthetic experiences via higher-order associative
brain regions. The hypothesis implies that inducing stimuli are
processed deeply before the conscious synesthetic experience
is elicited. This is relevant for our question about the role of
semantics in synesthesia: we already know that context can
strongly influence synesthetic experiences (e.g., Myles et al., 2003;
Dixon et al., 2006). This theory also presumes a significant role
for parietal cortex in synesthesia.
The cross-activation theory (Ramachandran and Hubbard,
2001) differs from the disinhibited feedback theory in proposing
that activity in the brain regions that are processing the
inducing stimulus, directly results in additional activity in brain
regions responsible for mediating the concurrent experience.
No intermediate, higher-order processing step is included and
instead aberrant anatomical connections between the regions
processing the inducing and concurrent stimuli are proposed.
The lack of an intermediate processing step implies that parietal
cortex is not crucial for synesthetic experience: However, in
a later update of the cross-activation model, a second stage
of (hyper-)binding through parietal mechanisms was added to
the theory (Hubbard et al., 2011). In this way the authors
acknowledged the growing evidence for an important role of
parietal cortex in synesthesia (see below). The cross-activation
theory accounts well for fast changes in electrophysiological
signals and is consistent with the apparent evidence that
synesthetes experience bottom-up perceptual pop-out in serial
search task, and with anatomical differences in the brains of
synesthetes. However, evidence for pop-out in synesthetes has
become challenged over time, and more and more data suggested
a crucial role of semantics in shaping synesthetic experiences.
The recent alternative theory of synesthesia proposed by
Mroczko-Wasowicz and Nikolic´ (2014) is based on a novel
proposal of how the brain deals with semantics, founded in the
theory of practopoieis (Nikolic´, 2015). This view implies that the
brain can quickly change its computational properties—i.e., it
can make quick learning-like changes—and that the extracted
meaning of a stimulus reflects those fast changes made to
how the network executes its computations. Examples of quick
adaptation of computational properties by the brain’s network are
for instance studies showing that context can affect synesthetic
experiences (e.g., an S/5-shaped stimulus presented either in the
context of digits of letters; Dixon et al., 2006).
The directionally changed patterns of functional connections
in synesthetes found by Van Leeuwen et al. (2011) are
partly consistent with the disinhibited feedback account of
synesthesia—namely, the model including an indirect pathway
to V4 via parietal regions that fit best for the associators—and
are partly consistent with the cross-activation theory—namely
the model with direct influences between the grapheme and
color area that fit best for projector synesthetes. It is clear,
however, that the process leading to synesthesia and its related
changes in effective connectivity involves a phase of learning
abstract entities for which semantics are important. During the
phase in which synesthesia develops, the network that processes
the inducing stimuli undergoes changes in its computational
properties to accomodate the phenomenon of synesthesia. The
conscious experience of the synesthetic concurrent is what
results; depending on the properties of the established network.
Especially relevant here is that conscious experience can depend
on the direction of information flow in the network (Van
Leeuwen et al., 2011).
DISCUSSION
The question of why physiological systems have qualia is arguably
the most difficult problem faced by neuroscience (Chalmers,
1995; Harnad, 1995). Research on synesthesia, alone, cannot
solve the big puzzle of qualia. However, due to the very nature
of the phenomenon of synesthesia—i.e., the additional qualia
that synesthetes experience—research efforts directed toward
understanding that phenomenon may assist in identifying the
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neural correlates of conscious experience. Thus, we can ask
whether the progress made in the last decade or two in the
research of synesthesia can be summarized in a way that is
informative for consciousness research.
Synesthesia is illustrative for the importance of the extraction
of meaning from stimuli for inducing phenomenal experiences.
The interplay between the physical synesthesia-inducing
stimulus and the way semantic associations finally shape the
phenotype of synesthesia helps us to realize that semantics shape
our experiences. Experiences do not exist isolated from person’s
understanding of the world. Semantics and understanding
also play a role in the proposal that much of the problems of
consciousness are determined by a social reality (Singer, 2015).
Importantly, the semantic aspect of synesthesia can also be put
to use in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness.
Ambiguous stimuli can elicit different synesthetic concurrents
of which the neural correlates might be identified. Additionally,
because the ambiguity is always resolved by top-down influences,
we can investigate the directionality in mediating phenomenal
experiences.
On the other hand, physiological investigations of synesthesia
have discovered the important role of the parietal cortex (Van
Leeuwen et al., 2010; Rouw et al., 2011; Neufeld et al., 2012a) and
of relating individual differences in synesthetic experiences to the
directions of effective connectivity (Van Leeuwen et al., 2011).
Even with activity in similar brain areas, the connectivity between
them determines the resulting phenomenal experience. Studies
of people with synesthesia under neutral “rest” circumstances
also lend support to altered network function that may be
directly related to the altered conscious experiences (Dovern
et al., 2012; Tomson et al., 2013). These neural correlates
of changes in conscious experience are still far away from
explaining how physiological mechanisms create experience.
Nevertheless, they may present important hints on where to look
for explanations and provide constraints for the neural correlates
of consciousness.
In summary, synesthesia may inform us about the neural
correlates of consciousness because of its unique mix of
phenomenal experiences that are largely dictated by semantics,
and because of established directionality effects in establishing
synesthetic experiences. We hope that consciousness research
and synesthesia research will be able to mutually inform
each other in the future and that the study of synesthetes
will become a mainstream approach in consciousness
research.
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